DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 178 373 SO 011 862

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TITLE Hitchhiking to Visibility: Women's Rights Enactments in the 1960s.
PUB DATE 28 Dec 78
NOTE 18p.; Paper presented at American Historical Association (San Francisco, California, December 28, 1978)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Changing Attitudes; *Civil Rights; Civil Rights Legislation; *Comparative Analysis; Federal Regulation; *Females; Government Role; Laws; Political Issues; *Racial Discrimination; *Sex Discrimination; Social Change; Social History; Social Status; *United States History

ABSTRACT

Demands made by the feminist movement in the 1960s are examined, with particular emphasis on influences of the black civil rights movement on these demands. It is suggested that the black civil rights movement encouraged women to demand an end to institutional discrimination in matters of sex as well as race, push for sex discrimination amendments to legislation dealing with racial discrimination, and escalate demands for further government guarantees and action. Crucial to the progress of the women's rights movement was the inclusion of clauses relating to sex discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Because the sex discrimination clause was included in the bill, the federal government was committed to eliminate sex discrimination in employment. Problems arose, however, when women's advocates realized that passage of legislation and enforcement were two separate processes. Organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) gained strength in reaction to the government's refusal to pursue sex discrimination with the same vigor as it pursued racial discrimination. Review of events in the women's movement of the 1960s suggests two considerations--that passage of some of the most significant victories for women preceded mass public support for them and that prohibiting sex discrimination in the same terms as discrimination by race encouraged public perception of the two issues as similar. (DB)

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HITCHHIKING TO VISIBILITY:

Women's Rights Enactments in the 1960s

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Paper read at

The American Historical Association

San Francisco, California

December 28, 1978

This copy does not constitute publication.

SP 011 862

Hitchhiking to Visibility:
Women's Rights Enactments in the 1960s

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"Despite circumstantial explanations," cautioned feminist Cellestine Ware in 1970, "the mystery of the resurgence of feminism in the end remains inviolate."[1] Whether or not that mystery has been satisfactorily solved in the past eight years, several recent studies have organized available information in ways which point to somewhat less mystical origins. Most notable here is sociologist Joreen Freeman's account, The Politics of Women's Liberation.[2] Freeman's emphasis is on the origin of feminist organizations as a social movement. Making clear her intent to focus on organization aspects of the subject, Freeman cautions her readers that "the general atmospheric changes" of the era, its intellectual climate and the way issues were perceived, "will be more assumed than delineated."[3]

This paper is an attempt to explore certain aspects of those atmospheric conditions, particularly the renewed emphasis by feminists on the similarities between racial and sex discrimination. Whereas Freeman explores the origin of feminist organization, this paper is an attempt to examine the origins of the political demands that the women's movement would be making in the 1960s. In this paper, it will be the organizational aspects of the movement which will be more assumed than delineated.

One of the striking features of the decade is that, with the exception of the Equal Rights Amendment which had first been proposed in 1923, there is almost no evidence from the early 1960s even of public discussion of, let alone organized support for, many of the political goals which women's groups were advocating, and had in fact achieved, ten years later. As Freeman among others has noted, an obvious external factor in the development of the feminist demands was the black

civil rights movement.[4] This paper will discuss two specific influences of that movement. First, from the black civil rights came the formulations designed to remedy institutional forms of discrimination which feminists claim operate against women also. Second, the black civil rights movement had the political clout during the 1960s to generate the necessary vehicles, those crucial legislation and administrative proposals dealing with racial discrimination, to which women's advocates could append amendments prohibiting sex discrimination. One of the special difficulties in tracing intellectual origins is in trying to document what was not publicly considered or perceived at one point in order to trace the influences that brought later perceptions and political goals into being. In the case of the women's movement, circumstances provide a convenient focal point which, while it might not represent the entire spectrum of opinion at the time, at least outlines the thinking of some prominent persons involved in the issue and some positions from which later groups would diverge sharply.

In 1961, President Kennedy appointed a Commission on the Status of Women chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt and Esther Peterson, director of the Women's Bureau of the Labor Department. Two years later, in 1963, the commission issued its report, entitled American Women. Still reflecting the historic perspective first developed by the Progressive movement sixty years earlier, that women were a group who need special protection against the harsh realities of industrial society, the commission specifically separated the issues of racial and sex discrimination.

> Executive Order 10925 now forbids discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin in employment under Federal contracts. ...We are aware that this order could be expanded to forbid discrimination based on sex. But discrimination based on sex, the Commission believes, involves problems sufficiently different from discrimination based on the other factors listed to make separate treatment preferable. Experience is needed in determining what constitutes unjustified discrimination in the treatment of women workers. ...Actually, situations vary far too much to make generalizations applicable and more information is needed on rates of quits, layoffs, absenteeism, and illness among women workers and on the qualifications of women for responsible supervisory executive positions.[5]

The report did urge some government action on behalf of women, calling for an executive order to insure women equal opportunity in hiring, training, and promotion in firms accepting Federal contracts. However, for companies not engaged in Federal contracts, the commission recommended only action to "encourage employers to comply with the Federal policy of nondiscrimination."[6] Rather than as objects of massive institutional discrimination who deserve equal treatment as "a matter of simple justice.", the report characterized women as an "underutilized resource" and urged their greater utilization in the public interest.

The Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that between 1958 and 1962 the country's productive capacity exceeded its actual output by some $170 billion, or almost $1,000 per person in the United States. Had this potential been realized, lower rates of unemployment and an impressive supply of additional goods and services would have contributed to national well-being. The currently unused resources of the American economy include much work that could be done by women.[7]

Aware that any sweeping bans on sex discrimination at the Federal level could undermine a large body of state protective legislation for female industrial workers, the President's Commission on the Status of Women went on record in opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. It argued that the "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments already provided adequate protection, although an "early and definitive court pronouncement" would help establish the principle more firmly. Therefore, the report recommended that "interested groups should give high priority to bringing under court review cases involving laws and practices which discriminate against women."[8]

Had such a report appeared ten years later, it would have been subject to immediate and blistering attacks from feminist groups. One index of public perception of the sex issue early in the decade is that, in the fall of 1963, the appearance of the Commission report attracted very little attention and had almost no immediate impact on policy. How does one account for the rapidly shifting perspectives on the political and economic status of American women?

In his work on the symbolic implications of political activity, political scientist Murray Edelman attacks what he claims is "the conventional model of the democratic process" in which"individuals comprising the mass public hold relatively stable positions on public issues and that public policy represents a response to some aggregation of these positions."[9] Instead, Edelman insists that events and public policy not only reflect public opinion but "are themselves potent influences upon change and mobilization of public attitudes."[10] In the conventional model, a group's political goals are assumed to be fairly stable and the group is supposedly satisfied to the extent that public policy conforms to that list of demands. What Edelman argues instead is that in the course of historical events surrounding the making of policy, a group perceives new threats or opportunities, new definitions of itself and its situation, and alters its goals accordingly. He goes so far as to state that "political actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting their stable substantiative demands but rather by changing the demands and expectations."[11]

This latter model seems admirably suited to the history of women's rights enactments in the 1960s. Significant victories by blacks and women early in the process stimulated women to escalate their demands for further government guarantees and action. Rather than a stable agenda of specific demands, women's groups tended to view victories won by blacks as legitimate and attainable goals for women.

Crucial to the progress of women's rights during the decade was the serendipitous inclusion of sex in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Southern representatives who wanted to defeat the measure or seriously cripple its administrative operation proposed an amendment to Title VII, the section dealing with employment, prohibiting discrimination based on sex. The original bill had listed only "race, color, creed, or national origin." House liberals supporting the bill as a guarantee primarily for blacks split on the "sex" amendment. Representative Edith Green (D, Oregon),

the only Congresswoman to vote against the sex amendment, pointed out its historically extraneous position within the bill:

> (To) the best of my knowledge, there was not one word of testimony in regard to this amendment given before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House or before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House, where this bill was considered. I repeat--there was not one single bit of testimony given in regard to this amendment. There was not one single organization in the entire United States that petitioned either one of these committees to add this amendment to the bill. There was not one single Member of the House who came to the Committee on Education and Labor or who came to the Committee on the Judiciary and offered such an amendment.[12]

James Roosevelt (D, California), son of the late chairwoman of the President's Commission on the Status of Women, quoted at length from the Commission's report on the differences between discrimination by race and by sex. However, Martha Griffiths (D, Michigan), a champion of feminist legislation throughout the decade, spoke out strongly for the amendment and later claimed she had planned to introduce it herself had Southern representatives not done so.[13] With solid Southern support and the rest of the House divided, the amendment was passed, 168-133.

The Johnson administration, through Mrs. Johnson's social secretary, quietly made it known that it favored Senate approval of the sex provision. With the list prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race, color, creed, sex, or national origin," the Senate passed the measure and President Johnson signed it.[14]

The circumstances of its enactment prompt three significant considerations. First, the vote on the amendment should not be interpreted as a clear demonstration of House sentiment, and certainly not of public opinion, on the merits of the issue. It passed by thirty-five votes, but 134 representatives - nearly one third of the House - did not vote at all. No one had testified in committee either for it or against it. Clearly, its inclusion in the Act could not be explained in what Edelman terms is the "conventional" democratic model, that public policy represents some "aggregation" of relatively stable positions of the public. This, of course, does not mean that its passage was anti-democratic, that public opinion

opposed it. Instead, in this instance, on one of the most crucial legislative victories for women, public opinion was essentially irrelevant. The black civil rights movement provided the legislative vehicle to which sex was appended, and it was apparently in terms of its impact on the bill's protection for blacks that many, if not in fact a majority of those voting on it, were considering it. It is highly unlikely that in 1964, a bill solely on sex discrimination could have survived the legislative gamut to come up for a floor vote.

Even its enactment went nearly unreported in the mass media. The New York Times briefly referred to it as a southern attempt to defeat the measure, Time Magazine did not mention it, and Newsweek gave it but one flippant paragraph.[15]

A second consideration, however, is that regardless of how it was passed, it nevertheless became law, committing the legal and moral authority of the Federal government to eliminating sex discrimination in employment. Furthermore, because it was a Federal statute, it superceded state protective legislation which had defined women as a group deserving special treatment. Therefore, what the President's Commission had so ardently sought to preserve, state protective legislation, was soon to be rendered null and void.

Third, treating sex and race the same way and including provisions against sex discrimination in a bill which had been generated by the civil rights struggle prompted some to associate the highly visible, emotionally charged black movement with the then fledgling activites of those advocating a greater role for women. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first in a series of enactments in which victories for blacks became the political agenda for women's rights advocates. Items in the President's Commission report did not become the checklist of the women's movement. It was the black civil rights movement through the decade which became the cutting edge and arbiter of what was possible to achieve.

However, as women's advocates were soon to realize, passage of legislation and

its enforcement are two separate processes. While women's advocates could amend black proposals to include sex as well, once the legislation was enacted, the two groups sometimes found themselves in direct competition for the finite resources of the enforcement agencies. The Equal Employment Opportunites Commission initially directed nearly all its resources toward racial discrimination and refused to take seriously the huge and complex matter of sex discrimination. The EEOC hired one temporary lawyer to handle all charges of sex discrimination filed with the Commission.[16]

Edelman argues that the political process alters a group's goals and aspiration. Furthermore, he maintains that the intensity of a group's interest in a broad political goal such as sexual or racial equality decreases in the degree that there is (1) constitutional, statutory, or administrative action dedicating "the state" to achieving the objective, and (2) frequently renewed ritualistic assertions, overt or implicit, that the objective is being achieved.[17]

In this case, women's rights advocates who were aware of the sex provisions in the Civil Rights Act expected government action on behalf of women. However, the failure of the EEOC to pursue race and sex discrimination with equal vigor created the "crisis" situation which Freeman argues precipitates organization within networks of persons sensitive to the issue.[18] Specifically, the EEOC forbade newspapers to separate "Help Wanted" advertisements according to racial preference of the employer but refused to forbid "Help Wanted-Male" and "Help Wanted-Female" designations. When delegates to the Third National Conference of Commissions on the Status of Women met in Washington in 1966, some women tried to introduce a resolution demanding more serious EEOC consideration of sex discrimination. When conference officials did not permit the proposal of any resolutions, a small group organized the National Organization for Women which they described as an "NAACP for women". Betty Friedan, author of The Feminine Mystique and NOW's first president, recalled that NOW attracted a

seething underground of women in the Government, the press and labor unions who felt powerless to stop the sabotage of this law that was supposed to break through the sex discrimination that pervaded every industry and profession, every factory, school and office.[19]

The emotional intensity of this "seething underground" had developed in reaction to the non-enforcement of the sex provision. Such intensity, from all indications, had not existed prior to the passage of the 1964 Act. The 1963 report of the President's commission had occasioned no sharp outcry when it insisted that race and sex discrimination were separate issues. In other words, the political intensity, and undoubtedly for many the new perception, of the issue emerged only after the legislative victory had been won. This interpretation supports Edelman's thesis that political actions significantly change demands and expectations. For some women, expectations had been created, and they now had a focus of attention, the EEOC which seemed responsible for an illegal and unjustified frustration of those expectations. Only after twenty-five months of insistent pressure, which included lobbying administration officials, attacks from the floor of Congress, sit-ins in prominent newspaper offices, picket lines, and finally a lawsuit against the EEOC, did the commission amend its earlier position and prohibit separate listings by sex on want-ad pages.[20]

However, while some had come to identify sex and race discrimination as similar forms of injustice, this perspective was still a minority viewpoint. President Johnson may not have favored the removal of the sex provision once the House had included it in the Civil Rights Act, but he himself did not include it a year later when he issued Executive Order 11246.[21] This order prohibited federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin. While the 1963 Women's Commission report had argued specifically against such action, getting this order amended to include sex became one of the first lobbying goals of NOW.[22] It took two years before Executive Order 11375 augmented the earlier order to prohibit sex discrimination in 1967. Once again, enforcement

did not immediately follow enactment. While the office of Federal Contract Compliance actively moved against racial discrimination, it took two years, until 1969, to draft even a proposal for specific guidelines to deal with discrimination on the basis of sex. In February, 1970, the Labor Department outlined its affirmative action requirements for racial minorities, but not until June did it issue similar goals for women.[23]

The history of these three enactments--the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the EEOC ruling prohibiting sex segregation of want ads, and the Labor Department's contract guidelines--all followed a similar pattern. Proposals originally designed for blacks were amended to include women. A fourth significant victory for women, the Democratic Party's guidelines on the selection of convention delegates, occurred in 1969. It too developed in a sequence similar to the first three. As political scientist E. E. Schattschneider notes, no political system can deal with all potential issues at the same time. One of the fundamental tasks of every system is to establish a priority for issues with which it is most concerned.[24] The historic circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Democratic Party's guidelines strongly suggest that, even at the end of the decade, the issue of sex discrimination was still not accorded a priority sufficient to command attention on its own merits but depended on the black movement to generate the vehicles to which it would be appended.

In 1964, in response to a walk-out at the national convention by Mississippi blacks who claimed to be the true Democratic Party in the state, the convention established an Equal Rights Committee to make recommendations to the National Democratic Committee. By 1968, this committee had put together a list of anti-discrimination standards, three of which prohibited distinctions based on race, color, creed, or national origin. It also recommended the establishment of a commission in order that full participation of all Democrats, regardless of race, color, creed

or national origin could be facilitated by uniform standards for structure and operation. Proposed four years after the 1964 Civil Rights Act had added "sex" to its list by a committee of the national party which had taken the lead in civil rights legislation, not one of the Equal Rights Committee recommendations mentioned discrimination on the basis of sex.

The 1968 Democratic Convention established such a commission to "recommend such improvements as can assure even broader citizen participation in the delegate selection process." Under the convention's mandate, party chairman Fred Harris appointed twenty-eight persons, only three of whom--barely 10%--were women, to the Democratic Party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection.[25] Senator George McGovern of South Dakota was named chairman, and Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa served as vice-chairman. The commission divided into task forces to conduct regional hearings to solicit recommendations and directed its staff to analyze state delegate procedures. From testimony collected at these hearings, advice requested from party leaders and academic personnel, and its own research, the staff drafted a set of proposed guidelines for state parties. The very first article prohibited "discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin" and "urged state parties to overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to encourage minority group participation (e.g. specifically inviting black Democrats to attend party meetings)."[26] The first draft of the staff guidelines, like the party's Equal Rights Committee recommendations, made no mention of sex discrimination.

It is important to reconstruct carefully the sequence of events which led to the final form of the McGovern Commission guidelines. When the full Commission met in September, 1969, to consider the first staff draft of the guidelines, they added a new section, Section A-2, separate from the one relating to race, dealing with discrimination on the basis of sex or age. At the time the sex and age provisions

were added, the guidelines were simply "urging", not "requiring", state parties to encourage broader participation. Nothing had been written in to require convention delegations to have a demographic balance. In fact, a problem the commission felt keenly was how to insure that affirmative action would occur so that minorities would have greater representation without imposing a rigid mathematical quota.

In November, as they met to approve a final draft of the guidelines, this question again appeared, and it is important to reconstruct the discussion. Significantly the debate opened with consideration of Section A-1, the problem as it related to racial discrimination. The first draft had merely "urged" state parties to take affirmative action, but black spokesmen argued that without some binding direction, state parties particularly in the South, would pay only lip-service to the guidelines. The problem was to put some teeth into the proposals to insure state action to open up the process without limiting the voters' rights to elect the delegates they wanted.

A motion to substitute the phrase "requires state parties" for "urges state parties" passed. Dr. Samuel Beer, a Harvard political scientist, moved to add to the wording "to encourage minority group participation" the words "and representation on delegations to the National Convention". This again brought up the problem of how to require representation of certain groups without a mathematical formula of some standard of compliance.[27]

Then Birch Bayh proposed an amendment which would require representation "in reasonable relation to the group's presence in the population."[28] Dr. Beer and several others opposed Bayh's amendment arguing that it was not the duty of the Commission to dictate to party members whom they had to select as delegates. A black asked why blacks should not be half the delegation if blacks were half the population of the state. The Bayh amendment was adopted.

When all of these proposals to Section A-1, dealing only with racial minorities had passed, the commission was on record requiring states to take affirmative action to see that blacks and other racial minorities were represented in "reasonable" proportion to their presence in the population.

After this, it was time to deal with Section A-2 on age and sex representation. A motion was made to extend the coverage just passed in the preceding section. But there was opposition. One member argued that there had been little discrimination because of age in 1968. The real battle had been between ideological positions, not age groups. Students had lost not because they were young but because they were in a minority. Open up the delegate selection process and remove the unit rule, and what looked like age discrimination disappears without any conscious affirmative action to insure representation of youth.

Not until fairly late in the discussion was the issue of sex discrimination raised, by one of the three women on the commission. Carman Warshaw, national committeewoman from California, took the commission to task for thinking in terms of what she called "expediency."

> I think that if we are only talking about racial and ethnic balance and refuse to talk about women and youth, then we are only talking about expediency and if this is a party only of expediency then we are not serving our purpose or the Democratic voters of this country, and I don't believe we're a party of expediency.[29]

It was not the political power of women or youth which demanded their inclusion in the reform mandate, Warshaw's comments imply. Had it been, provision for them would indeed have been expedient. Shortly after Warshaw, Kathryn Peden, former secretary of state for Kentucky, argued that failing to give women the same guarantees as blacks would be "backing down".

> I think for us to back down on the position of women in the Democratic Party would be just as substantive a mistake we would make as if we had backed down on the race, creed, or national origin issue.[30]

By 1969, the burden of proof could be made to fall on those who would <u>not</u> prohibit

sex discrimination, a far more advantageous position for women. The commission approved the resolution to provide the same guarantees for women and youth they had just granted to blacks, but by a smaller margin and with less enthusiasm from several commission members.

The years from 1969 to 1972 would witness a rapid growth in women's rights organizations, in part spurred by extensive media coverage. Congress would begin hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment, and over 5,000 women would march in New York City in its support. The National Women's Political Caucus organized in 1971, followed shortly by state caucuses along the same lines to promote women seeking office and feminist issues.

This chronology of events of the decade suggests two considerations. The first is that passage of some of the most significant victories for women preceded mass public support for them. Unlike the black civil rights movement which had been pushing for nearly a decade before Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, by the time the women's movement developed a significant mass following, some extremely important legal redefinitions of the status of women had already occurred. Policy preceded mass support, reversing the civics-book wisdom of how a democratic system works.

The second consideration builds on the first but expands it. Not only did policy precede mass support. Prohibiting sex discrimination in the same terms as discrimination by race encouraged public perception of them as similar issues and increased the visibility of the sex issue. In his study of the women's movement of the previous decade, William Chafe insists that the historian must distinguish between social forces external to the group and independent of it on one hand and the groups' own perception of itself, its relation to its social environment, and its response to its situation. "The basic problem, then," writes Chafe, "is to determine the relation of social change to specific collective behavior, attempting

where possible to pinpoint causal connections."[31] Again, an extremely difficult task for the historian is to document what was absent at a particular time, but in view of the 1963 Women's Commission report, and, more telling, the absence of any widespread adverse reaction to it, one is led to conclude that the events of the decade, principally the enactment of legislation and administrative rulings treating racial and sex discrimination in a similar manner, were crucial factors in the generation of a new public perception of the status of women.

In a major treatise, The Human Condition, philosopher Hannah Arendt defines one of the outstanding characteristics of all political action to be its "inherent unpredictability," that no one possesses the ability "to foretell all the logical consequences of a political act".[32] It would be interesting to ask southern Congressmen who proposed the sex amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act if they would try the same tactic again if they had a chance to do it over.

Footnotes

1. Cellestine Ware, Woman Power: The Movement for Women's Liberation (New York: Tower Publications, Inc., 1970), p. 7.

2. Joreen Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975).

3. Freeman, p. 4.

4. See also William Chafe, Women and Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). Freeman acknowledges the impact of the black civil rights movement: "The black civil rights movement had a very profound effect on many segments of our society. Even though it cannot be measured, its influence on American women. . . should not be underestimated." Freeman also briefly discusses the relationship of the nineteenth-century abolition and women's movements and mentions Gunnar Myrdal's development of the theme in his American Dilemma. Freeman, pp. 27-28.

5. President's Commission on the Status of Women, American Women (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 30, 29.

6. American Women, p. 30.

7. American Women, p. 30.

8. American Women, p. 45.

9. Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 4.

10. Edelman, p. 4.

11. Edelman, p. 32.

12. Congressional Record, February 8, 1964, p. 2582.

13. Freeman, p. 53.

14. The standard account of the passage of the "sex" amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act is found in Caroline Bird, "Ladies Day in the House", Born Female (rev. ed.; David McKay Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 1-18.

15. See The New York Times, February 9, 1963, p. 53; Newsweek 63 (February 17, 1964): 15; Time Magazine 83 (February 14, 1964): 14. Time even stated that Judge Howard Smith's amendments to defeat the measure were defeated, citing one example designed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment.

16. Bird, pp. 14-15.

17. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 164.

18. Freeman, pp. 48-9.

19. Betty Friedan, "Up From the Kitchen Floor," The New York Times Magazine, March 4, 1973, p. 28.

20. See Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, Rebirth of Feminism (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 404-408.

21. Hole and Levine, p. 44.

22. Freeman, p. 75.

23. Hole and Levine, p. 418.

24. E. E. Schattschneider, A Semi-Soverign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 68. In this context, Schattschneider states: "The greatest hazard to any faction is not a frontal attack by the opposition but a flank attack by bigger, collateral, inconsistent and irrelavant competitors for the attention and loyalty of the public. If there are degrees of intensity, the more intense will become dominant. The result is a reduction in the number of conflicts that can develop. The process is not to divide and divide and divide to infinity but to divide and unify as a part of the same process. For this reason it is probable that there exist a great number of potential conflicts in the community which cannot be developed because they are blotted out by stronger systems and antagonism. Thus the unequal intensity of conflicts determines the shape of the political system." p. 68.

25. See Democratic National Committee, Mandate for Reform: A Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the National Democratic Committee (Washington, D.C.).

26. Staff Memorandum to Executive Committee, Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, National Democratic Party, "Proposed Guideline: 'Full, Meaningful, and Timely' Opportunity to Participate in the Delegate Selection Process," in papers of the Democratic Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, stored in the National Archives, Washington, D. C., as of November, 1972.

27. Transcripts of hearings of Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, November, 1969 session, in Commission papers, Tape Side 2, p. 3.

28. Transcripts, Tape Side 2, p. 11.

29. Transcripts, Tape Side 5, p. 2.

30. Transcripts, Tape Side 5, p. 7.

31. Chafe, p. 82.

32. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Anchor Books edition; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959), p. 32.